refused to approve the initial plan on the ground that it called for a cul-de-sac of more than 1000 feet (which required GPI to build a bridge at great expense), even though other developers did not have such a requirement. With respect to the appellees' conduct regarding the North parcel, GPI alleges that they: 4. GPI alleges that the appellees rejected its plans and in doing so, acting in concert with others, maliciously, arbitrarily, capriciously and for their own personal interests, obstructed GPI from making reasonable use of its property. 3 In 19, GPI submitted separate subdivision plans to the appellees to develop the parcels.
GPI held the property for ten years without attempting to develop it. Thus, we will partially reverse the order of December 12, 1991, though we will affirm the dismissal of two aspects of GPI's claim for relief.Īpparently, the public has been freely using horse trails located on the South parcel. We conclude that federal adjudication of most of GPI's claims would not interfere with the state proceedings. The district court on its own motion dismissed the complaint on Younger abstention grounds in recognition of ongoing state judicial proceedings. § 1983, on the ground that the appellees, acting under color of state law, conspired to deprive it of its constitutionally protected property rights. GPI sought injunctive and monetary relief under 42 U.S.C. (GPI) appeals from a district court order of December 12, 1991, dismissing its complaint against appellees Lower Gwynedd Township and the five members of the Township's Board of Supervisors, its governing body, sued in both their individual and official capacities. Before: GREENBERG, NYGAARD and WEIS, Circuit Judges. Roos (argued), Wisler, Pearlstine, Talone, Craig, Garrity & Potash, Blue Bell, Pa., for appellees. Petersen, Hangley, Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman, & Ewing, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.
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